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Objective. To determine the impact of Florida’s Medicaid Reform Demonstration on
per member per month (PMPM) Medicaid expenditures.
Data. Florida Medicaid claims data from the two fiscal years before implementation of
the Demonstration (FY0405, FY0506) and the first two fiscal years after implementation
(FY0607, FY0708) from two reform counties and two nonreform counties.
Study Design. A difference-in-difference approach was used to compare changes in
expenditures before and after implementation of reforms between the reform counties
and the nonreform counties.
Data Extraction. Medicaid claims and eligibility files were extracted for enrollees in the
reform and nonreform counties and collapsed into monthly amounts (N 5 16,875,467).
Principal Findings. When examining the entire population, the reforms had little
impact on PMPM expenditures, particularly among SSI enrollees. PMPM expenditures
for SSI enrollees increased by an additional U.S.$0.35 in the reform counties compared
with the nonreform counties and increased by an additional U.S.$2.38 for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) enrollees. An analysis that limited the sample to
individuals with at least 3 or 6 months of observations pre- and postimplementation,
however, showed reduced PMPM expenditures of U.S.$11.15–U.S.$19.44 PMPM for
both the SSI and TANF populations.
Conclusions. Although Medicaid reforms in Florida did not result in significant re-
ductions in PMPM expenditures when examining the full population, it does appear that
expenditure reductions may be achieved among Medicaid enrollees with more stable
enrollment, who have more exposure to managed care activities and may have more
health care needs than the overall Medicaid population.
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Medicaid is the principal state and federal program that finances the health
and medical care of low-income families, some elders, and people with dis-
abilities who meet eligibility requirements, do not have health insurance, and
otherwise cannot pay for their health care. In the 2006–2007 fiscal year
(FY0607), Florida Medicaid served three million people, with expenditures of
approximately U.S.$14 billion (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured 2007; National Association of Budget Office 2008). For the 2008–
2009 fiscal year (FY0809), Florida Medicaid expenditures are estimated at
U.S.$6,619 per eligible enrollee for a total of U.S.$15 billion (Agency for
Health Care Administration 2008; Williams 2009). Given budget challenges
in Florida and other states, expansion of Medicaid-managed care is an attrac-
tive alternative because it can potentially control costs by ensuring appropriate
health care utilization, and, by providing insurance through private health
plans, potentially making Medicaid more similar to commercial coverage
(LewinGroup 2009). Most studies on the impact of Medicaid-managed care
have focused on health care access and utilization (Eberly et al. 2010; Zucker-
man et al. 2002; Garrett et al. 2003; Garrett and Zuckerman 2005; Cook 2007;
Burns 2009a, b) and results have been mixed. However, despite the strong
belief among policy makers in the ability of managed care to reduce health
care costs, its economic impact has not been as well explored. In 2004, the
LewinGroup published a report that synthesized findings from 24 studies
examining the effect of the implementation of managed care programs on
Medicaid savings throughout the United States (LewinGroup 2009). Accord-
ing to this report, the majority of Medicaid-managed care programs resulted in
cost savings; however, the savings ranged from only 0.5 to 20 percent. More-
over, Medicaid-managed care programs led to higher enrollee satisfaction and
improved access. The report concluded that the savings are generally attrib-
uted to reductions in inpatient utilization and prescription drug expenditures.
In an attempt to control escalating costs and improve the Medicaid
system, the Florida Legislature authorized a demonstration that would be-
come known as ‘‘Medicaid Reform’’ in Senate Bill 838. A Section 1115 waiver
was sought and approved in 2005. The demonstration began on July 1, 2006,
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and was approved for initial pilot implementation in two counties. Broward
and Duval counties were selected for the initial pilot implementation because
of the large number of Medicaid enrollees in those counties and their will-
ingness to participate in the demonstration. The reforms to Florida’s Medicaid
program were based on empowering consumers to take control of their health
care, providing more choices for consumers, and enhancing the health status
of Medicaid enrollees through increased health literacy and incentives to en-
gage in healthy behaviors. Furthermore, a key objective of Florida’s Medicaid
demonstration included making the delivery of medical care in Medicaid
more reflective of the processes and approaches operative in the private sec-
tor. The reforms required Medicaid enrollees to choose either a Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO) or a Provider Service Network (PSN),
which were allowed to offer customized benefit packages. The benefit pack-
ages were subject to tests of actuarial equivalency and benefit sufficiency.
Medicaid enrollees in the nonreform counties could voluntarily choose be-
tween an HMO or fee-for-service (FFS) primary care case management
(PCCM) within 30 days of initial enrollment in Medicaid, but they were au-
tomatically assigned to either an HMO or PCCM if they had not voluntarily
enrolled within 30 days. Medicaid beneficiaries in residential care facilities,
children with special health care needs, and enrollees who also received
Medicare benefits were not required to select a managed care plan.
HMOs participating in the Medicaid demonstration are paid a capita-
tion payment that is risk adjusted to reflect the relative health care status of
their enrollees. Reform capitation rates are based on specific principles and
policies applied to FFS historical data in identifiable areas. That rate is then
risk adjusted to reflect the medical circumstances of a particular plan’s enrol-
lees, based on the enrollees’ age, gender, and use of prescription medications
that serves as an indicator of certain chronic diseases. The technical approach
to this adjustment is based on the calculation of risk scores using the Medicaid
Rx risk adjustment model devised by researchers at the University of Cal-
ifornia, San Diego (Gilmore et al. 2001). For the first 2 years of the demon-
stration, a risk corridor was mandated so that risk adjustment was limited to
 10 percent of the original base rate. PSNs participating in Florida Med-
icaid are paid on an FFS basis.
In order to facilitate enrollee selection of a health plan, Florida Medicaid
created the Choice Counseling process. Choice Counseling is a comprehen-
sive counseling program designed to provide the education and outreach
necessary to assist Medicaid enrollees with making a health plan choice that
best fits their specific needs and to promote healthy lifestyles in order to reduce
Expenditures in Florida’s Medicaid Reform Demonstration 789
minority health disparities. Another key element was the creation of an En-
hanced Benefits Rewards (EBR) program, which offered financial incentives
to participate in specific health promotion and illness prevention activities
such as dental visits, vision exams, wellness visits, PAP screening, mammog-
raphy screening, and colorectal screening (Agency for Health Care Admin-
istration 2009). When enrollees complete an EBR activity, funds are placed in
their account and can be utilized for purchasing certain over-the-counter items
at any Florida Medicaid participating pharmacy.
A key goal of the demonstration has been to achieve greater predict-
ability in Florida’s Medicaid expenditures, with the ultimate objective of im-
proved capacity to manage program costs (Agency for Health Care
Administration 2005; Snipes 2009). The objective of this study is to assess
the degree to which Florida’s Medicaid reform initiative has impacted per
member per month (PMPM) expenditures.
METHODS
Analytic Approach
The basic analytic approach is to compare changes in expenditures in the
reform counties to changes in expenditures in comparable counties in Florida
that were not participating in the demonstration. This difference-in-difference
approach takes into account changes in Medicaid expenditures that may have
been occurring in Florida regardless of the reform demonstration. The ex-
penditures examined do not include administrative costs incurred by Florida’s
Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). Changes in expenditures
between the two fiscal years before the implementation of reforms (FY0405
and FY0506) and the first 2 years of the reform (FY0607 and FY0708) in the
two urban reform counties of Broward and Duval (the ‘‘reform counties’’)
were measured and compared with changes in two other Florida urban coun-
ties, Hillsborough and Orange Counties (the ‘‘nonreform counties’’). Broward
County includes urban communities north of Miami, such as Fort Lauderdale
and Hollywood. Duval County is in Northeast Florida and is the location of
Jacksonville. Hillsborough County is located in the central west section of
Florida and includes the city of Tampa. Orange County is located in central
Florida and includes the city of Orlando. The urbanity, population size, and
demographics of Hillsborough and Orange Counties are generally similar to
those of Broward and Duval Counties.
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The nonreform counties are also reasonably comparable in terms of
their Medicaid programs and enrollment characteristics during the period
immediately preceding the demonstration, although the nonreform counties
have a higher percentage of African American enrollees and a lower per-
centage of Latino enrollees (see Table 1). Hillsborough and Orange Counties
do not have any PSN market penetration, so in the comparisons, MediPass
(Florida’s PCCM program) enrollment is used as a proxy for PSN enrollment,
since both are paid on an FFS basis. Enrollees in Duval did not have a PSN
plan option until Medicaid Reform was implemented in September 2006. For
the 2 years before the demonstration, the HMO market penetration rate for
both the reform and nonreform counties was over 50 percent, with the non-
reform counties having a slightly higher HMO presence. Compared with the
nonreform counties, the reform counties had a slightly higher MediPass/PSN
enrollment, partly due to the absence of PSNs in the nonreform counties. In
general, the proportion of HMO and PSN/MediPass enrollment for the Re-
form counties compared with the nonreform counties was similar for both
years before the demonstration program initiation. While the difference in
demographic and program characteristics are acknowledged, the two non-






N 5 8,095,300 N 5 8,753,088
Age 23.2 24.2
Caucasian 30.2 31.6





Enrolled in HMO 57.8 58.8
Enrolled in FFS/PCCM/PSN 42.2 41.2
Notes. The unit of observation in a person month. Because the data represent the complete pop-
ulation of interest, all differences are significant. PSNs only operated in the reform counties after
implementation of reform. Before implementation of reform, Medicaid enrollees in the reform
counties had to select either an HMO, PCCM, or traditional FFS. Enrollees in the nonreform
counties selected from HMOs, PCCM, or FFS in all time periods. FFS/PCCM/PSN are combined
because they are all paid on an FFS basis.
FFS, fee-for-service; HMO, Health Maintenance Organization; PCCM, primary care case man-
agement; PSN, provider service networks.
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reform counties selected for this analysis provide reasonable comparators for
the difference-in-difference methodology.
Data
To calculate prereform expenditures, all facility, medical, and pharmacy
claims or analogous HMO capitation payment amounts were obtained for all
Medicaid enrollees who lived at least 1 month in Broward or Duval County
and were in an eligibility category that would have made them eligible to
participate in the demonstration had it existed during FY0405 or FY0506. This
included individuals with eligibility based on Supplemental Social Security
Income (SSI) and children and families with eligibility through Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Individuals eligible through SSI or
TANF are considered mandatory participants in the demonstration. Certain
individuals, including dually eligible (participating in both Medicaid and
Medicare) and pregnant women, were not required to participate in the dem-
onstration but could voluntarily participate. To ensure genuine comparability,
those enrollee months where individuals were voluntarily eligible for the
waiver and/or special services (e.g., AIDS waiver, Statewide Inpatient Psy-
chiatric Program [SIPP] services, etc.) or included retroactive eligibility were
not included in the calculations. In addition, children who received services
through a special program for children with special health care needs were
excluded from the calculations. Because many individuals moved in and out
of Duval and Broward Counties and/or changed eligibility during this time,
only those months where the individual lived in one of the reform counties
and was in a reform eligible category were used to calculate baseline PMPM
expenditures.
The analysis used a person-month approach, meaning each observation
corresponds to expenditures by a person in a month. Therefore, each indi-
vidual could contribute up to 24 member-months used in the prereform cal-
culations (one for each month of the two fiscal years). Using this method, the
final prereform sample from Broward and Duval Counties included 5,152,099
member-months, with 656,855 eligible through SSI (36 percent enrolled in
HMO, 60 percent enrolled in PCCM, and 4 percent in FFS) and 4,495,244
eligible through TANF (50 percent enrolled in HMO, 48 percent enrolled in
PCCM, and 2 percent in FFS). To calculate reform expenditures, all payments
made to HMOs and PSNs for reform enrollees who were enrolled for at least 1
month during FY0607 and FY0708 (the first 2 years of the demonstration)
were included. For PSNs, PMPM expenditures were the sum of all paid
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amounts for claims in a given month, including a monthly patient case man-
agement fee paid to PSN providers, while for HMOs the PMPM expenditures
were simply the monthly risk-adjusted capitated premiums. Months where
individuals were eligible for waiver and/or special services or which included
retroactive eligibility were not included in the prereform or reform calcula-
tions. As with the prereform sample, each observation corresponds to expen-
ditures for a person in a month, meaning each individual could contribute up
to 22 member-months in the calculations (the reform health plans did not
begin enrolling individuals until September 1, 2006). In the first year of the
demonstration, the Medicaid population in the reform counties was transi-
tioned over a period of several months into reform health plans. The transition
was completed in April 2007 (Agency for Health Care Administration 2007).
This resulted in a final reform sample of 2,943,201 member-months from
FY0607 and FY0708 combined, with 394,764 eligible through SSI (59 percent
enrolled in HMO and 41 percent in PSN) and 2,548,437 eligible through
TANF (74 percent enrolled in HMO and 26 percent in PSN).
As indicated above, overall time trends for the Medicaid expenditures
were accounted for by including expenditures for enrollees in the nonreform
counties. The same selection criteria for enrollees and services used for
the calculation of PMPM expenditures in the reform counties were used to
calculate PMPM expenditures for enrollees in the nonreform counties. This
resulted in a final nonreform sample of 4,768,599 member-months for
FY0405–FY0506, with 762,920 eligible through SSI (51 percent enrolled in
HMO and 49 percent in PCCM) and 4,005,679 eligible through TANF
(61 percent enrolled in HMO and 39 percent enrolled in PCCM), and
3,984,489 member-months for FY0607–FY0708, with 686,506 eligible
through SSI (49 percent enrolled in HMO and 51 percent enrolled in PCCM)
and 3,297,983 enrolled through TANF (60 percent enrolled in HMO and 40
percent enrolled in PCCM).
Statistical Analysis
First, unadjusted differences in average PMPM expenditures between the re-
form period and the prereform period were calculated for the reform counties
and the nonreform counties, and then the difference in difference (reform
counties difference minus nonreform counties difference) was calculated.
These differences were calculated separately for SSI and TANF enrollees
and calculations were done on the full sample and with the top 5 percent of
observations removed to diminish the influence of outliers.
Expenditures in Florida’s Medicaid Reform Demonstration 793
The subjects are a complete database of the eligible Medicaid enrollees
germane to this analytic question, as distinct from a random sample. We
examine the change in average expenditures for all enrollees in the reform and
nonreform counties, in the prereform and reform period, and not an individ-
ual’s expenditure change over time. It was not practical to examine individual
changes over time because of the high rate of turnover among Medicaid
enrollees. Examining individual changes over time would greatly limit the
sample.
Next, a series of multivariate analyses was conducted to better under-
stand the pattern of changes in expenditures after controlling for any differ-
ences in age, race, or gender between the nonreform and reform counties. As
with the univariate analysis, the multivariate analysis used a difference-in-
difference approach. These analyses examined whether the change in PMPM
expenditures over time significantly differed between the reform versus non-
reform counties. The data were highly skewed with long tails, and a log trans-
formation did not allow the data to approach normality. As a result, several
different panel data models were estimated to determine which model
achieved the best fit. The models estimated included both one-part and two-
part models, generalized estimating equations (GEEs) using a gamma family
with a log link, a log-linear random effects regression, and linear regression
using untransformed PMPM expenditures, but with the top 5 percent of ob-
servations removed to reduce skewness and kurtosis. Because expenditures
were calculated on a PMPM basis, the unit of analysis is a person-month. Thus,
an individual could provide up to 48 observations to the analyses. All models
used the XT procedures of Stata to account for correlation of observations
over time (StataCorp 2007). The one-part GEE model using the gamma family
with a log link and random effects displayed adequate model fit and although
this model does not have the same precision as a log-linear model in the
presence of long tails, it produces consistent estimates and precision is not a
serious issue given the extremely large sample size used in the analysis (Man-
ning and Mullahy 2001). Thus, the results presented focus on the gamma
regression model.
The model includes a variable for time (‘‘time’’ coded as months 1–48), a
dummy variable for whether the observation was from the post implemen-
tation period of FY0607–FY0708 (referred to as ‘‘post’’), a dummy variable
indicating whether the observation was from one of the counties that partic-
ipated in reform (referred to as ‘‘reformcounty’’), an interaction of time and
post (time  post), an interaction of time and reform county (time  reform-
county), a dummy variable indicating that the observation was from the post-
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period and a reform county (post  reformcounty), and an interaction of time,
postperiod, and reform county (time  post reformcounty). This model es-
timates separate slopes pre- and postreform for both the reform and non-
reform counties and specifically tests whether the differences in slopes
pre- and postimplementation of reform is different between the reform and
nonreform county (indicated by the coefficient for time post reform-
county). The model also indicates whether there was a shift in the intercept in
the reform counties once the demonstration was implemented (indicated by
the coefficient for post  reformcounty). The estimated equation is
PMPM Expendituresit ¼ expðb0 þ Timetb1 þ Postib2 þ reformcountyib3
þ Timet  Postib4 þ Timet  reformcountyib5
þ Posti  reformcountyib6 þ Timet  Post i
 reformcountyib7 þ Ageb8 þGenderb9 þ Raceb10 þ eitÞ
where eit follows a gamma distribution and ‘‘exp’’ signifies the log link. Thus,
b6 indicates the difference in the intercept for the period after implementation
of reform for observations from reform counties and b7 tests whether the
change in the slope pre- and postimplementation of reform was significantly
different for the reform counties than for the nonreform counties. This equa-
tion was estimated separately for enrollees in SSI and TANF.
Next, the estimated equation was used to predict PMPM expenditure in
the pre- and postimplementation of demonstration period for both nonreform
and reform counties. The approach taken was to assume that everyone in the
sample (enrollees in nonreform and reform counties) was either in the reform
counties or the nonreform counties and then predict expenditures for each of
the time periods. This allows the demographics to be identical for the esti-
mation samples and simulates what would have happened if everyone were
either in a nonreform plan or everyone was in a reform plan. The difference in
predicted expenditures pre- and postimplementation is then calculated for
reform and nonreform groups separately and then the difference of this
difference is calculated between the reform and nonreform counties.
Although it was not possible to examine an individual’s change in ex-
penditures between the prereform and reform period, two additional analyses
were conducted where, first, the sample was limited to individuals who con-
tributed at least three person-months of observations in both the prereform
and reform periods and, second, the sample was limited to individuals who
contributed at least six person-months of observations in the prereform and
reform periods. These analyses assessed the change in expenditures among
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enrollees with more stable Medicaid enrollment and who received Medicaid
services in both the prereform and reform periods.
RESULTS
Unadjusted results are presented in Table 2. Average PMPM expenditures for
SSI enrollees in the reform counties were U.S.$82 lower in the first 2 years of
the demonstration (FY0607–FY0708), compared with FY0405–FY0506. In
the nonreform counties, average PMPM expenditures for SSI enrollees were
U.S.$150 higher in FY0607–FY0708 compared with FY0405–FY0506. Thus,
relative to the nonreform counties, expenditures for SSI enrollees in the re-
form counties were lower by U.S.$232 PMPM during the first 2 years of the
demonstration, compared with the 2 years immediately prior. For TANF
enrollees in reform counties, average PMPM expenditures were the same in
the first 2 years of the demonstration compared with the 2 years prior. How-
ever, for TANF enrollees in nonreform counties, average PMPM expenditures
were U.S.$10 higher in FY0607–FY0708 compared with FY0405–FY0506.
Therefore, relative to nonreform counties, Medicaid expenditures in the
Table 2: Unadjusted Changes in PMPM Expenditures between Reform and









Full sample SSI TANF SSI TANF SSI TANF
Prereform 865 131 683 126
Reform 783 131 833 136
Reform–prereform  82 0 150 10 232 10
Top 5% removed
Prereform 433 72 408 78
Reform 563 102 472 84
Reform–prereform 130 30 64 6  66  24
Notes. Prereform period is FY0405–FY0506.
Reform period is FY0607–FY0708.
PMPM, per member per month; SSI, supplemental social security income; TANF, temporary
assistance for needy families.
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reform counties were U.S.$10 PMPM less during the first 2 years of the dem-
onstration compared with the 2 years prior. However, when the top 5 percent
of observations are removed (Table 2), PMPM expenditures increased to a
greater extent in the reform counties compared with the nonreform counties
for both SSI and TANF populations.
Next, multivariate analyses controlling for the impact of sociodemo-
graphic factors such as age, gender, and race on enrollee expenditures was
conducted for SSI enrollees and TANF enrollees (Tables 3 and 4). As men-
tioned previously, the coefficient for post reformcounty shows the shift in
the intercept that occurred for enrollees in reform counties after implemen-
tation of the demonstration and the coefficient for time  post  reformcounty
indicates whether the change in the trend in expenditures after implementation
of the demonstration in the reform counties was significantly different from the
change in the trend over the same time period for the nonreform counties. For
SSI enrollees (Table 3), the coefficient for post  reformcounty was 0.023, but
Table 3: Multivariate Analysis of PMPM Expenditures for SSI Enrollees
Coefficient 95% CI p-Value
Time 0.006 0.005, 0.007 o.001
Post 0.070 0.025, 0.114 .002
Reformcounty 0.163 0.139, 0.187 o.001
Time  post  0.002  0.003,  0.0003 .020
Time  reformcounty  0.002  0.003,  0.0005 .005
Post  reformcounty 0.023  0.055, 0.101 .563
Time  post  reformcounty  0.001  0.004, 0.001 .365
PMPM, per member per month; SSI, supplemental social security income.
Table 4: Multivariate Analysis of PMPM Expenditures for TANF Enrollees
Coefficient 95% CI p-Value
Time 0.004 0.003, 0.005 o.001
Post 0.576 0.543, 0.609 o.001
Reformcounty 0.060 0.046, 0.073 o.001
Time  post  0.019  0.020,  0.017 o.001
Time  reformcounty  0.003  0.004,  0.002 o.001
Post  reformcounty  0.169  0.219,  0.119 o.001
Time  post  reformcounty 0.009 0.007, 0.010 o.001
PMPM, per member per month; TANF, temporary assistance for needy families.
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was not statistically significant (p 5 .563) while the coefficient for
time  post  reformcounty was  .001 and was also not statistically signifi-
cant (p 5 .365). However, when the slope and intercept effects are tested
jointly, there is a significant impact (w2(2) 5 11.25, p 5 .004). Because of the
offsetting effects of the slope and intercept, the predicted expenditures are
compared with assess the overall impact. The predicted PMPM expenditures if
everyone was in the reform counties (Table 5) was U.S.$864.04 (SE 5 0.25)
before the demonstration and U.S.$883.82 (SE 5 0.56) afterwards, an increase
of U.S.$19.78 (SE 5 0.03). If everyone had been in the nonreform counties,
PMPM expenditures would have been U.S.$764.60 (SE 5 0.22) during the
period before the demonstration and U.S.$784.03 (SE 5 0.22) for the period
after, an increase of U.S.$19.43 (SE 5 0.014). Thus, the difference in the change
in expenditures between the reform and nonreform counties was U.S.$0.35.
Although this difference is statistically significant (w2(2) 5 11.25, p 5 0.004), the
very small effect size suggests that there was essentially no effect of the dem-
onstration on PMPM expenditures among SSI enrollees. In the additional
analyses that limit the sample to only those SSI enrollees with at least 3 or 6
months of observations in both the prereform and reform periods, some
differences emerged (full results available from the authors upon request). In
the analysis limited to people with at least 3 months of observations in the
prereform and reform period, the difference in the change in expenditures was
U.S.$11.15, while the difference in the change in expenditures was U.S.$19.44
when limited to individuals with at least 6 months of observations in both time
periods. So when the analysis is limited to individuals with at least some





Reform Counties Nonreform Counties
Nonreform–
Reform
SSI TANF SSI TANF SSI TANF
Prereform 864.04 132.09 764.60 133.98
Reform 883.82 158.51 784.03 158.02
Reform–prereform 19.78 26.42 19.43 24.04 0.35 2.38
PMPM, per member per month; SSI, supplemental social security income; TANF, temporary
assistance for needy families.
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observations in both the prereform and reform periods, it appears that some
expenditure reductions are observed in the reform counties.
For TANF enrollees (Table 4), the coefficient for post  reformcounty
was  0.169 (po.001) and the coefficient for time  post  reformcounty was
0.009 (po.001), suggesting that there was lower PMPM expenditures in re-
form counties initially, but expenditures were increasing at a greater rate in the
reform counties than in the nonreform counties. The slope and intercept
effects are jointly statistically significant (w2(2) 5 1003, po.001). Because these
are offsetting effects, it is important to examine the overall impact by assessing
the predicted expenditures (Table 5). If everyone was in the reform counties,
the PMPM expenditures in the demonstration period would have been
U.S.$132.09 (SE 5 0.02), while they would have been U.S.$158.51 (SE 5 0.02)
after implementation of reform, a difference of U.S.$26.42 (SE 5 0.01). If ev-
eryone had been in the nonreform counties, on the other hand, the PMPM
expenditures during the predemonstration period would have been
U.S.$133.98 (SE 5 0.02), while they would have been U.S.$158.02
(SE 5 0.02) in the postreform period, a difference of U.S.$24.04 (SE 5 0.01).
Thus, the difference in the difference is U.S.$2.38 (SE 5 0.005), suggesting that
the demonstration results in greater PMPM expenditures for TANF enrollees
than what would have occurred in the absence of the demonstration. In the
sensitivity analyses that limit the analysis to only TANF enrollees with at least
3 or 6 months of observations in both the prereform and reform periods, the
results change. In the analysis limited to people with at least 3 months of
observations in the prereform and reform periods, the difference in the change
in expenditures was U.S.$15.84, while the difference in the change in expen-
ditures was U.S.$13.44 when limited to individuals with at least 6 months of
observations in both time periods. So when the analysis is limited to individ-
uals with at least some observations in both the prereform and reform periods,
it appears that some expenditure reductions are observed in the reform coun-
ties for the TANF population as well.
Finally, one of the stated goals of the reforms was to improve predict-
ability of expenditures. It appears that variability in expenditures improved in
the reform counties compared with the nonreform counties. In the reform
counties, the standard deviation of PMPM expenditures for SSI enrollees was
U.S.$3,080 in the prereform period and U.S.$2,126 after reform, while in the
nonreform counties, variability increased, with the standard deviation going
from U.S.$2,331 prereform to U.S.$2,513 postreform. Similarly, in the reform
counties, the standard deviation of PMPM expenditures for TANF enrollees
decreased from U.S.$819 to U.S.$491 between the prereform and reform
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period, but increased from U.S.$736 to U.S.$907 over the same time period
in the nonreform counties.
DISCUSSION
After adjusting for demographic differences in the multivariate analysis that
included the full population of enrollees, there was essentially no impact of the
demonstration on PMPM expenditures for SSI enrollees, and slightly higher
PMPM expenditures among TANF enrollees. Although the unadjusted results
mirror those of other state Medicaid programs that have implemented man-
aged care and found savings among the SSI population (LewinGroup 2009),
the adjusted results for Florida’s demonstration diverges from those in pre-
vious studies, showing essentially no reduction in expenditures. This diver-
gence from previous studies examining the impact of Medicaid-managed care
may be due to differences in adjustment methods, but unfortunately this is
difficult to assess because the majority of previous studies were conducted by
consulting groups that do not provide detailed descriptions of their estimation
procedures. However, a study of SSI Medicaid beneficiaries using the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey was consistent with our main findings, concluding
that the implementation of managed care did not result in lower spending for
this population (Burns 2009a, b). It should be noted, though, that some re-
ductions in expenditures were observed when the analysis was limited to
individuals who had a minimum number of months of Medicaid enrollment in
both the prereform and reform periods, suggesting that the reforms may
achieve expenditure reductions among enrollees with more stable Medicaid
enrollment. Because of this differential effect, there is clearly some selection or
other phenomenon occurring. One possible explanation is that individuals
with more stable Medicaid enrollment are sicker than individuals with less
stable coverage and a minimum number of months of exposure to managed
care are necessary to achieve reductions in expenditures.
It is also important to understand that this study does not look at what is
driving the observed changes in expenditures. It is possible that reform plans
are providing more preventive care than nonreform plans, which costs more
in the short run but may reduce the need for expensive acute care services
such as emergency room visits and inpatient stays in the long run. Unfortu-
nately, encounter data were not available from HMOs at the time this study
was conducted, so it is impossible to examine changes in use of specific ser-
vices for the majority of patients enrolled in reform health plans. As a result,
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this study only looked at the association of the reforms with PMPM expen-
ditures incurred by the state. Previous studies that examined cost savings from
managed care have consistently shown cost savings being driven by decreases
in utilization of inpatient services (LewinGroup 2009).
It is critically important that the limitations of this analysis be under-
stood. First, this study only examined expenditures for the first two fiscal years
of the demonstration; thus, it is not known whether the observed trends in
expenditures will be sustained over time. In addition, this analysis did not
measure changes in expenditures for individual enrollees, pre- and postdem-
onstration implementation. The PMPM expenditure calculations during the
predemonstration period refer to enrollees during that time period, a different
group of individuals than those who are the basis for calculating PMPM ex-
penditures in the postreform period. For instance, case mix might have varied
over these periods. However, given that the analyses were limited to individ-
uals enrolled in Medicaid through SSI and TANF, the same exclusion criteria
were applied in all time periods, and a difference-in-difference approach is
used, it is unlikely that case-mix differences are driving these results.
Additionally, the expenditures were calculated solely from claims and
monthly capitated premium payments. The PSNs under reform are operating
on an FFS basis while the HMOs are paid monthly risk-adjusted premiums
directly from Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration. Therefore, the
expenditure amounts attributed to the HMO enrollees do not measure ex-
penditures for direct care provided to enrollees. Expenditures for direct care
provided to capitated enrollees cannot be calculated until encounter data are
available for all HMOs participating in the demonstration. Because of the
absence of encounter data at the time this analysis was completed, it is difficult
to determine the source of the observed decreases in unadjusted expenditures
and whether this is attributable to appropriate management of care by the
plans or other factors such as a possible reduction in services (e.g., specialty
care, emergency room, hospitalizations). This will be important to know in
order to determine whether observed decreases in expenditures are due to a
more efficient provision of care by the HMOs and PSNs participating in
reform, or from reduced access to care. Also, the data do not include out-
of-pocket payments by enrollees, so it is not possible to know whether the
reforms changed out-of-pocket cost burden in this population. It is also im-
portant to note that the demonstration expenditures noted in this analysis do
not include expenditures incurred to administer Reform activities such as the
Choice Counseling Program or the Enhanced Benefit Rewards program; nor
does it include the costs to health plans to participate in the demonstration
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(e.g., maintaining/updating contracts, reporting, etc.). Administrative costs
such as these were not provided to the study team as part of the evaluation.
Finally, this study focused on care provided to enrollees living in two urban
areas. It is not known at this time what the impact will be for enrollees living in
rural areas.
Although expenditure reductions were not evident after adjustment in
this study in the full population, reductions were observed among enrollees
with more stable enrollment. It is important to continue to monitor the impact
of these reforms on expenditures. Other Medicaid-managed care programs
have consistently shown cost savings to increase over time, with savings tend-
ing to be larger during the third and fourth years relative to the first couple of
years after implementation of managed care (LewinGroup 2009). Thus, it is
possible that expenditure reductions in the full population will not be realized
until the demonstration program is in its third, fourth, or fifth year. Future
research will also assess whether HMOs or PSNs are controlling costs better in
Florida’s Medicaid program, which will help policy makers in the future de-
cide on the best model for provision of care to their Medicaid enrollees. Such
ongoing analysis may be especially salient with reference to the PSNs, because
they manifest several attributes of Accountable Care Organizations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Joint Acknowledgment/Disclosure Statement: This study was funded through a
contract with Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration. The authors
would like to thank Lilliana Bell and Agency for Health Care Administration




Agency for Health Care Administration. ‘‘Florida Medicaid HMO Enrollment Report
September 2006–July 2008 [Data file]’’ [accessed on April 2009]. Available at
http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/mchq/managed_health_care/mhmo/med_prev_Vol_
Man_Enrol.shtml
Agency for Health Care Administration. ‘‘Florida MediPass/Medicaid HMO Recipient
Enrollment Report July 2004–July 2008 [Data file]’’ [accessed on April 2009].
802 HSR: Health Services Research 46:3 ( June 2011)
Available at http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/mchq/managed_health_care/mhmo/
med_prev_Vol_Man_Enrol.shtml
Agency for Health Care Administration. ‘‘Florida Medicaid Managed Care [19159b]
and Medicaid Demonstration 1115 Enrollment Report as of November 1, 2009’’
[accessed on November 2009]. Available at http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/mchq/
managed_health_care/mhmo/med_comp_enroll_prev.shtml
Agency for Health Care Administration. 2005. ‘‘Florida Medicaid Reform Application
for 1115 Research and Demonstration Waiver August 30, 2005’’ [accessed on
May 2009]. Available at http://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/medicaid_
reform/waiver/pdfs/medicaid_reform_waiver_final_101905.pdf
Agency for Health Care Administration. 2007. ‘‘Florida Medicaid Reform Year 1, Final
Annual Report, July 1, 2006–June 30, 2007’’ [accessed on May 2009]. Available
at http://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/medicaid_reform/pdf/medicaid_reform_
final_annual_report_year_one.pdf
Agency for Health Care Administration. 2008. ‘‘Florida Medicaid Summary of Ser-
vices Fiscal Year 08/09’’ [accessed on September 22, 2009]. Available at http://
ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/pdffiles/SS_08_080701_SOS.pdf
Agency for Health Care Administration. 2009. ‘‘Healthy Behaviors with Approved
Credit Amounts’’ [accessed on May 14, 2009]. Available at http://ahca.myflor
ida.com/Medicaid/Enhanced_Benefits/approved_credit_amounts_031009.pdf
Burns, M. E. 2009a. ‘‘Medicaid Managed Care and Cost Containment in the Adult
Disabled Population.’’ Medical Care 47 (10): 1069–76.
——————. 2009b. ‘‘Medicaid Managed Care and Health Care Access for Adult Benefi-
ciaries with Disabilities.’’ Health Services Research 44 (5, part 1): 1521–41.
Cook, B. L. 2007. ‘‘Effect of Medicaid Managed Care on Racial Disparities in Health
Care Access.’’ Health Services Research 42 (1, part 1): 124–45.
Eberly, T., A. Davidoff, and C. Miller. 2010. Managing the Gap: Evaluating the Impact
of Medicaid Managed Care on Preventive Care Receipt by Child and Adoles-
cent Minority Populations.’’ Journal of Health Care for Poor and Underserved 21 (1):
92–111.
Garrett, B., A. J. Davidoff, and A. Yemane. 2003. ‘‘Effects of Medicaid Managed Care
Programs on Health Services Access and Use.’’ Health Services Research 38 (2):
575–94.
Garrett, B., and S. Zuckerman. 2005. ‘‘National Estimates of the Effects of Mandatory
Medicaid Managed Care Programs on Health Care Access and Use, 1997–
1999.’’ Medical Care 43 (7): 649–57.
Gilmore, T., R. Kronick, P. Fishman, and T. G. Ganiats. 2001. ‘‘The Medicaid RX
Model: Pharmacy-Based Risk Adjustment for Public Programs.’’ Medical Care
39 (11): 1188–202.
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. 2007. ‘‘Total Medicaid Enroll-
ment, FY2006 (Updated 2009)’’ [accessed on April 14, 2009]. Available at http://
www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=198&cat=4
LewinGroup. 2009. Medicaid Managed Care Cost Savings——A Synthesis of 24 Studies.
Washington, DC.
Expenditures in Florida’s Medicaid Reform Demonstration 803
Manning, W. G., and J. Mullahy. 2001. ‘‘Estimating Log Models: To Transform or Not
to Transform?’’ Journal of Health Economics 20 (4): 461–94.
National Association of Budget Office. 2008. ‘‘Fiscal Year 2007: State Expenditure
Report’’ [accessed on April 24, 2009]. Available at http://www.nasbo.org/
Publications/PDFs/FY07%20State%20Expenditure%20Report.pdf
Snipes, D. 2009. ‘‘Florida Medicaid Reform. Tallahassee, Florida: Agency for Health
Care Administration. PowerPoint presented to the House Health Care Appro-
priations Committee’’ [accessed on May 15, 2009]. Available at http://ahca.
myflorida.com/Medicaid/deputy_secretary/recent_presentations/fl_medicaid
StataCorp. 2007. Stata Statistical Software: Release 10.0 Special Edition. College Station,
TX: Stata Corporation.
Williams, P. 2009. ‘‘Florida Medicaid: Program Overview. Tallahassee, Florida:
Agency for Health Care Administration. PowerPoint presented to the Senate
Health and Human Services Appropriations Committee’’ [accessed on May 14,
2009]. Available at http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/deputy_secretary/
recent_presentations/medicaid_program_overview_shhsa_021009.pdf
Zuckerman, S., N. Brennan, and A. Yemane. 2002. ‘‘Has Medicaid Managed Care
Affected Beneficiary Access and Use?’’ Inquiry 39 (3): 221–42.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this
article:
Appendix SA1: Author Matrix.
Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or func-
tionality of any supporting materials supplied by the authors. Any queries
(other than missing material) should be directed to the corresponding author
for the article.
804 HSR: Health Services Research 46:3 ( June 2011)
